Fausto Coppi’s final triumph at the Giro d’Italia was a masterpiece of tactical intelligence. It was 1953, and the Campionissimo no longer had the legs to dominate as he once did. He was up against Hugo Koblet, a phenomenal descender who could gain between 90 seconds and 2 minutes on each descent. Yet Coppi, with meticulous patience, saved every ounce of energy for the decisive moment: the attack on the penultimate stage. It was a strategy of restraint – a lesson echoed, remarkably, 72 years later in Simon Yates’ victory. With one big difference: the Englishman also capitalized on his rivals’ major mistakes.
I’ve often voiced criticism of UAE Team Emirates’ tactical choices, both in Grand Tours and Monuments like Milan–San Remo. Not everyone agrees, of course. But it’s easy to overlook poor decisions when Majka and Pogacar are there to erase them with superhuman legs. However, when your riders are merely mortal, and your energy has limits, strategic flaws start to show.
It’s hard to understand how, on the Colle delle Finestre, Del Toro focused entirely on marking Carapaz while letting Simon Yates slip away. A serious misjudgment that changed the race. Let’s be clear: it was not Carapaz’s job to chase in that situation, as some commentary suggested. Whoever loses the leader’s jersey has to take responsibility. Full stop.
I opened this piece with a reference to Coppi not only for the tactical parallel but also to recall that he won his first Giro at age 20 – in an era when the average age of riders was much higher than today. He wasn’t a one-off: Saronni also won young, and many others contended for the maglia rosa in their early twenties. So no, youth is not an excuse for throwing away an opportunity like this.
Del Toro didn’t just lose the Giro d’Italia – and who knows if he’ll ever get such a chance again? Yes, he’s young. But how often does the top favorite crash out, the second contender get stung by an insect, and other key rivals go down too? The stars aligned in his favor, and he let it all slip through his fingers.
And he didn’t just lose the race. He gained a declared enemy. Carapaz was furious with the Mexican’s tactical behavior. In the final kilometers, he refused to cooperate – and he had every reason not to. He had already given everything on the climb, only to be neutralized by Del Toro, who seemed more focused on making Carapaz lose than on trying to win himself.
That’s why I still believe race radios are a problem. Without them, Del Toro might have actually won. Because when you see a rider like Yates getting away, no one in their right mind just watches. Del Toro may lack experience, but he’s not clueless. He was guided – poorly – by a team car that completely misread the race.
Now, I’m not against technology as a whole: GPS trackers for safety should be mandatory, both in road and mountain biking. They can save lives. But radios are a different issue. The real danger is when the radio empties the rider’s head – when it robs them of their ability to read the race, to feel it with their legs. And what you see from the team car window will never match what’s experienced in the saddle, riding on the limit.
